Bank-Specific Characteristics and Monetary Policy Transmission: The Case of Italy by Leonardo Gambacorta
Temididiscussione
del Servizio Studi
Bank-specific characteristics and monetary policy transmission:
t h ec a s eo fI t a l y
by Leonardo Gambacorta
Number 430 - December 20012
ThepurposeoftheTemididiscussioneseriesistopromote the circulationofworking
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:
ANDREA BRANDOLINI,F ABRIZIO BALASSONE,M ATTEO BUGAMELLI,F ABIO BUSETTI,R ICCARDO
CRISTADORO,L UCA DEDOLA,F ABIO FORNARI,P ATRIZIO PAGANO;R AFFAELA BISCEGLIA
(Editorial Assistant).
This paper is part of a research project conducted within the Monetary Transmission
Network of the Eurosystem, a group of economists affiliated with National Central Banks
and the European Central Bank. This paper, like the others that are part of the project,
was presented and discussed in internal workshops and at the conference “Monetary














This paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel of monetary policy in Italy from 1986 to 1998 using a panel approach. After a
monetary tightening the decrease in deposits subject to reserve requirements is sharper for
those banks that have less incentive to shield the effect of a monetary squeeze: small banks
characterized by a higher ratio of deposits to loans and well-capitalized banks that have a
greater capacity to raise other forms of external funds. As to lending, size does not affect the
banks’ reaction to a monetary policy impulse. This can be explained by a closer customer
relationship, which provides an incentive for small banks, which are more liquid on average,
to smooth the effects of a tightening on credit supplied. Banks’ liquidity is the most
significant factor enabling them to attenuate the effect of a decrease in deposits on lending.
JEL classification: E44, E51, E52.
Keywords: monetary policy, transmission mechanisms, bank lending channel.
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The “lending channel” hypothesis postulates the existence of a channel of monetary
policy transmission through bank credit. Such a channel is independent of the traditional
“money channel”, which considers the effects of changes in the real interest rate on
economic activity; it stems instead from financial market incompleteness and hinges upon
imperfect substitutability between bank loans and privately-issued debt. If some borrowers
not only households but presumably also small firms do not have access to the capital
market, their expenditure and investment decisions depend exclusively on bank credit and
self-financing: in this case, every change in the composition of bank assets affects both the
level and the distribution of private consumption and investment expenditure.
At the aggregate level, monetary shocks that affect deposits alter bank’s credit supply;
if the resulting reduction in funds cannot be offset with other sources of financing, the
shocks translate into real effects. This mechanism can vary between banks with different
degrees of access to non-deposit funding. According to Kashyap and Stein (1995), the
lending channel should be more important for small banks, which have a very simple capital
structure and are financed almost exclusively with deposits and common equity. The impact
of the bank lending channel should also be greater  for banks with less liquid assets and less
capital. Less liquid banks cannot protect their loan portfolio against monetary tightening
simply by drawing down cash and securities (Kashyap and Stein, 2000); poorly capitalized
banks have less access to markets for uninsured funding, so their lending is more dependent
on monetary policy shocks (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Stein, 1998).
The present paper tests cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the bank
lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Italy from 1986 to 1998. The reaction of
bank deposits and loans to monetary shocks has been analyzed through a panel study, taking
simultaneously into account the bank-specific characteristics of size, liquidity and
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capitalization. Since the structure of the Italian banking system is quite different from that of
the US, it is interesting to verify whether the distributional effects are similar to those
traditionally detected in the literature.
The results indicate the existence of shifts in deposit demand and loan supply due to
monetary policy action. The effects of monetary policy differ among banks: after a
tightening the decrease in deposits is more pronounced for the banks that have less incentive
to shield the effect of a monetary squeeze: small banks with a higher ratio of deposits to
loans and well-capitalized banks with greater capacity to raise other forms of external funds.
On the lending side, the size and the capitalization of banks do not affect their reaction to a
monetary policy impulse. Rather, the primary factor enabling banks to contain the effect of a
deposit drop on lending is their degree of liquidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the problem of
identifying the existence of a “credit channel” and Section 3 describes the institutional
characteristics of the Italian economy in the eighties and the nineties. After a description of
the econometric model and the data in Section 4, Section 5 presents evidence on the response
of the main banks’ balance-sheet items (deposits, loans and liquidity) to a monetary shock.
Section 6 checks the robustness of the results. Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions.
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#!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According to the traditional “money channel” theory (IS-LM model), a monetary
tightening (such as a decrease in total reserves) reduces deposits. Bank assets (bonds and
loans) are perfect substitutes and demand for them is a negative function of a common
interest rate (). After a monetary tightening, equilibrium is reached through an increase in ,
which reduces money demand to match supply, while on the asset side of banks’ balance
sheet, bonds and loans fall to match deposits. The effects on the real economy come via the
reduction in investment and consumption due to the higher cost of capital. No attention is
paid to changes in firms’ finance.
The model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) shows that if some borrowers have limited
access to the capital market and depend on bank credit for external funding, bonds and loans
are imperfect substitutes and changes in the composition of bank assets also influence9
investment financing. In response to a monetary restriction, the “lending channel” works if
the reduction in credit is larger than that in other forms of financing to firms. , the
interest rate spread between loans and bonds should widen, although this may depend upon
the institutional characteristics of credit markets.
The identification problem consists in separating the effects of the traditional money
channel from those of the bank lending channel. A stylized explanation of the functioning of
the lending channel is provided in Figure 1, which shows the simultaneous equilibria in the
markets for loans (L) and corporate bonds (B). Quantities are on the horizontal axis, interest
rates on the vertical. Firm liabilities are given by credit demand (Ld) and bond supply (Bs),
while bank assets are represented by the supply of loans (Ls) and the demand for bonds (Bd).
At the initial equilibrium point, for simplicity, the interest rates on bonds and loans are equal
(0ρ 0 ).
In Figure 1a, which represents the case of similar elasticities for the demand and
supply curves, after a monetary restriction banks modify their asset composition, reducing
the supply of loans (from Ls to Ls’) and the demand for bonds (from Bd to Bd’). If some
agents do not have access to the capital market, the reduction in lending will be greater than
that in bond purchases, which causes an increase in the spread (ρ -). In other words, when
elasticities are similar, the credit channel response to a monetary tightening is identified with
an increase in the spread on the price side, and in a greater reduction in bank loans than in
other forms of corporate financing on the quantity side.
2
                                                          
2 The effect on the spread could not hold if the monetary restriction also caused an investment reduction and
a decrease in credit demand (Ld moves downwards). In this case, the loan-bond spread could be reduced even if
the bank lending channel is at work. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that an investment reduction should also
decrease the supply of bonds (Bs moves downwards), so it is plausible that the final effect would be an increase
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It is worth remembering that loan supply shifts could also be originated by a “balance
sheet channel”, working through the relative prices of the guarantees provided to the banks
(Mishkin, 1995; Oliner and Rodebusch, 1996; Kashyap and Stein, 1997): a monetary
squeeze increases debt service which can prompt sales of real assets, reducing their value
and causing a loss of creditworthiness and a reduction of lending. In this situation there is a
greater incentive for banks to finance less risky projects and to start a “flight to quality”
(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Lang and Nakamura, 1995).
The result clearly depends upon the elasticities of the functions. Let us assume that
credit demand is more elastic than bond supply (Ld, see Figure 1b). This could happen if
firms were not heavily dependent upon bank credit and the bond market were very efficient
in solving asymmetric information problems, but such a situation seems realistic only if bank
credit has some form of additional costs with respect to the bond market. In this case, it is
clear that even if a bank lending channel exists, the loan-bond spread diminishes;
nevertheless there could be always a greater reduction in lending than in bond issues.
The bold line Ld
* represents the opposite case: loan demand is more inelastic than bond
supply. In this situation the credit market is characterized by substantial asymmetric
information mainly for small firms that do not have access to other sources of financing; in
such circumstances the effect on the spread would be amplified and lending would contract
less than bond issues. The economic intuition behind this result is that due to the bank-
customer relationship, loans are more shielded than bonds.
After a monetary tightening, banks sell securities mainly to attenuate the reduction in
lending, so as to preserve the credit relationship with the client. In this case the size of the
adjustment of liquid assets in the bank’s portfolio will depend upon the customer links
between the bank and the client. Therefore, in order to correctly identify a monetary
restriction, we should observe a reduction not only in loans but also in securities holdings.
Indeed, a decrease in lending combined with an increase in the securities portfolio could be
the result of a simple reallocation of assets, independent from exogenous monetary shocks.12
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Two conditions are necessary for there to be a distinct bank lending channel of
monetary policy transmission: (1) some firms and households must be dependent on bank
loans; (2) the monetary authority must be able to shift the bank’s loan supply schedule.
Italy provides an interesting case study to test the existence of the bank lending
channel. As regards the first condition, in the period examined here, 1986 to 1998, private
debt markets have been less developed than in the US or UK (commercial paper and private
bonds had a limited role) and banks’ portfolios consisted mainly of government paper, which
dominated the bond market. Therefore the business sector has been heavily dependent on
bank credit, while the small size of the capital market has limited the diversification of bank
assets.
3
National financial accounts show that at the end of 1998 bonds accounted for only 1
per cent of the total financial liabilities of Italian firms. This figure, similar to that for
Germany, is lower than in France and Spain (4 per cent) or the United Kingdom (7 per cent).
Another indicator of the importance of banks in financing business is major stock market
capitalization. In Italy and Germany this is relatively low (respectively, 46 and 48 per cent of
GDP), compared with France (65 per cent), Spain (69 per cent), the Netherlands (153 per
cent) and the United Kingdom (165 per cent) where there are many large corporations
(Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese, 1999).
As to our second condition, the monetary authorities’ ability to shift the bank’s loan
supply schedule, some institutional details suggest that it has been greater in Italy than in
other countries. At the beginning of the 1980s the Italian banking system was quite tightly
regulated: 1) foreign exchange controls were in place; 2) the establishment of new banks and
the opening of new bank branches were subject to authorization
4; 3) competition was curbed
limited by mandatory maturity specialization, with special credit institutions operating at
medium-long term maturities and commercial banks at short term; 4) bank lending was
                                                          
3 A brief summary of Italian financial reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s is available in Cottarelli et
al. (1995) and Passacantando (1996), among others.
4 Before 1987 the Bank of Italy authorized the opening of new branches on the basis of a 4-year plan
reflecting estimated local needs for banking services.13
subject to a ceiling. All these restrictions were gradually removed between the mid-1980s
and the early 1990s (Passacantando, 1996): 1) foreign exchange controls were lifted between
1987 and 1990; 2) branching was liberalized in 1990; 3) the 1993 Banking Law allowed
banks and special credit institutions to perform all banking activities
5; 4) the lending ceiling
was definitely removed in 1985.
Other factors increased the ability of the monetary authorities to control the banks’
loan supply schedule. Almost all bank liabilities were subject to the reserve requirement.
CDs longer than 18 months were not excluded from reserve requirements until May 1994.
Until 1992 only special credit institutions could issue bonds; regular commercial banks
started to use this form of funding  only in 1995.
In principle, therefore, the financial structure of the Italian economy during this period
makes more likely that a credit channel was at work. Table 1 summarizes some indicators
concerning the relative importance of such a channel in the main countries of the euro area.
Each factor is given a grade from A to C. “A” indicates the lowest degree of sensitivity to
monetary policy. The first two columns are adapted from Borio (1996). The first indicator
highlights the weight of bank credit respect to total credit (defined as the sum of banking
credit and bonds, with the exclusion of trade credit). The second factor taken into
consideration is real guarantees (share of secured loans in total bank lending): the higher the
share of loans backed by collateral, the sharper should be the variations of bank lending in
response to a tightening of monetary policy via the balance sheet channel.
Other factors that could explain the effectiveness of the lending channel in the EMU
area are proposed by Kashyap and Stein (1997). The third column represents the importance
of small banks, measured by the share of commercial bank assets held by the three largest
commercial banks. As we have seen, following Kashyap and Stein (1995), small banks
should be more responsive to monetary tightening. The fourth column gives the importance
                                                          
5 The 1993 Banking Law completed the enactment of the institutional, operational and maturity
despecialization of the Italian banking system and ensured the consistency of supervisory controls and
intermediaries’ range of operations with the single market framework. The business restriction imposed by the
1936 Banking Law, which distinguished between banks that could raise short-term funds (“aziende di credito”)
and those that could not (“Istituti di credito speciale”), was eliminated. For more details see the Annual Report
of the Bank of Italy for 1993. The potential impact of this regulation on the results of the study has been
checked in Section 6.14
of small firms. In fact, the international differences in the efficacy of the credit channel also
depends on differences in productivity. As Guiso et al. (1999) suggest, smaller firms are
more likely to rely on a small bank and may thus be more subject to the lending channel. The
fifth column represents the availability of non-bank finance, measured by equity value as a
percentage of GDP.
From the last column, which illustrates a subjective weighting of the factors, Italy
emerges (together with Greece and Portugal) as the country where the potential relevance of
a lending channel for monetary policy transmission is greatest.
6
Table 2 summarizes studies on the credit channel for Italy. Most empirical works
confirm the existence of an aggregate credit channel (Buttiglione and Ferri, 1994; Angeloni
et al., 1995; Bagliano and Favero, 1995; Fanelli and Paruolo, 1999; Chiades and
Gambacorta, 2000), while conflicting results are presented by Bagliano and Favero (1996),
de Bondt (1999) and Favero et al. (1999). However, there is much less evidence on the
effects of bank-specific characteristics on the effectiveness of the lending channel. Moreover
in these studies the evidence on the disaggregated prediction of Kashyap and Stein (1995)
concerning the role of size is weak: only de Bondt (1999) finds a size effect when the
monetary policy stance is measured by a monetary condition index.
                                                          
6 Guiso et al. (1999) also suggest a number of structural features that would be useful to measure the
efficiency of credit markets such as the relative time required to repossess collateral in the event of a default
and the estimated legal costs of repossessing a house in the event of mortgage default. Both variables are very
























Belgium 84 [C] 34 [A] 44 [A] 64.7 [B] 0.39 [A] [A/B]
Denmark n.a. - n.a. - 64 [B] 80.7 [B] 0.32 [A] [B]
France 63 [A] 41 [C] 64 [B] 69.0 [B] 0.34 [B] [B]
Germany 84 [C] 36 [B] 89 [C] 65.9 [A] 0.24 [B] [B]
Greece n.a. - n.a. - 98 [B] 82.7 [C] 0.09 [C] [C]
Ireland n.a. - n.a. - 94 [B] n.a. [B] 0.43 [B] [B]
Italy 85 [C] 40 [C] 36 [B] 80.3 [C] 0.19 [C] [C]
Luxembourg n.a. - n.a. - 17 [C] 74.5 [A] 1.81 [B] [B]
Netherlands 71 [A] 36 [B] 59 [A] 75.5 [C] 0.90 [B] [A/B]
Portugal n.a. - n.a. - 38 [B] 79.0 [C] 0.18 [C] [C]
Spain 82 [B] 33 [A] 50 [B] 84.7 [C] 0.35 [B] [B]
United
Kingdom
45 [A] 59 [C] 29 [A] 66.2 [A] 1.28 [A] [A/B]
Note: A grade of  “A” indicates low effect of lending channel sensitivity to monetary policy; a grade “C”
indicates high sensitivity. Columns 1-2 are adapted from Borio (1996); columns 3-5 are taken from Kashyap
and Stein (1997). (1) Share of bank credit with respect to total credit defined as credit obtained by domestic
households and businesses from domestic financial institutions plus any securities outstanding (not held by
those institutions). It excludes trade credit and loans from abroad and from the Government. All figures refer
to 1993. (2) Share of loans backed by collateral. (3) Commercial bank assets in the three largest commercial
banks. The figures refer to 1993. Source: Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997). (4) Percentage of employment in firms
with less than 500 people. Source: Commission of the European Communities, Enterprises in Europe, 1994.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The empirical specifications, based on Kashyap and Stein (1995), are designed to test
whether banks react differently to monetary policy shocks.
7 The model is given by the
following equation, which includes interaction terms that are the product of the monetary
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with =1,…, 	  and  =1, …, 
 and where
N = number of banks
LW  = deposits, loans or liquidity of bank i in quarter t
 W  = monetary policy indicator
LW  = real GDP
π W = inflation rate
LW = bank-specific characteristic (size, liquidity, capitalization)
The model allows for fixed effects across banks, as indicated by the bank-specific
intercept µ i. Four lags have been introduced in order to obtain white noise residuals. The
model in growth rates has been chosen because variables in levels are integrated of order one
(this has been verified by an augmented Dickey Fuller test). This was the approach used by
Kashyap and Stein (1995) to avoid the problem of spurious correlations.
                                                          
7 An explanation of the model is in Ehrmann et al. (2001).18
The sample used goes from the fourth quarter of 1986 to the fourth quarter of 1998.
The interest rate taken as monetary policy indicator is that on repurchase agreements
between the Bank of Italy and credit institutions. CPI inflation and the growth rate of real
GDP are used to control for demand effects. The introduction of these two variables allows
us to capture cyclical movements and serves to isolate the monetary policy component of
interest rate changes. For more details on the dataset see the appendix.
To test for the existence of distributional effects of monetary policy among banks, the






















































− = ∑ ∑
Size is measured by the log of total assets, LW. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid
assets LW (cash, interbank lending and securities) to total assets, and capitalization is given by
the ratio of capital and reserves, LW, to total assets.
All three criteria are normalized with respect to their average across all the banks in the
respective sample, in order to get indicators that sum to zero over all observations. This
means that for the regression model (1), the average of the interaction term  M W LW   − − ∆ 1  is
also zero, and the parameters  M β  are directly interpretable as the average monetary policy
effect. The size indicator has been normalized not just with respect to the mean over the
whole sample period but also with respect to each single period. This removes unwanted
trends in size (namely, that due to the fact that size is measured in nominal terms).
Ehrmann et al. (2001) present detailed information on the characteristics of the whole
dataset on December 1998, before the filtering process. The sample represents 92 per cent of
total system assets. Table 3 gives some basic information on what bank balance sheets look19
like after the filtering for loan regressions.
8 The first three parts of the table split the sample
with respect to size, liquidity and capitalization, the last gives information on the whole
dataset.
The first part brings out differences between “big” and “small” banks. Small banks are
more liquid and better capitalized. This result fits with the standard idea that smaller banks
need big buffer stocks of securities because of their limited ability to raise external finance
on the capital market. This interpretation is confirmed on the liability side, where the
percentage of deposits (overnight deposits, CDs and savings accounts) is greater among
small banks, while their bonds issues are more limited.
Liquid banks are smaller and better capitalized than average. Their bond portfolio
consists mainly of government paper. Low liquid banks have less deposits and make more
loans. They have also a higher percentage of short-term loans, which should increase the
speed of the bank lending channel transmission.
Poorly capitalized banks make more loans, mainly at short term, and are less liquid.
On the liability side, they raise less deposits and issue less bonds. They are larger than
average in size.
 
The main results of the study are summarized in Tables 4-7, which present the long-
run elasticities of the models.
9 These have been estimated using the GMM estimator
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency and consistency provided
that the models are not subject to serial correlation of order two and that the instruments used
are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test).
10
                                                          
8 The characteristics of the datasets used for deposit and liquidity regressions are very similar and are not
reported. They are composed, respectively, of 629 and 531 banks. For more details see the appendix.
9 The complete set of coefficients of the models is available from the author upon request. Standard error
for the long run effect have been approximated with the “delta method” which expands a function of a random
variable with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao, 1973).
10 In the GMM estimation, instruments are the second and further lags of the growth rate of the dependent
variable and of the bank-specific characteristics included in each equation. Inflation, GDP growth rate and the
monetary policy indicator are considered as exogenous variables.20
Table 4 presents the results of benchmark regressions, which do not include any
specific bank’s variables; it aims at detecting the monetary policy effects on deposits, loans
and liquidity for the average sample bank. The existence of distributional effects is tested in
Tables 5-7, which do take bank-specific characteristics into account. Models 1 to 3 include,
one at a time, size, liquidity and capitalization; Model 4 considers these three indicators
together to test the robustness of previous results; Model 5 checks the double interaction
between size and liquidity.
 
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The results reported in Table 5 show that the long-run effects of monetary policy on
total deposits (which are subject to reserve requirements) are significantly different from
zero and do not differ too much among the models. These estimates roughly imply that a 1
per cent increase in the monetary policy indicator leads to a decline in deposits of around
0.6-0.8 per cent for the average bank in the long run. The long-run multipliers are lower than
the sum of the lagged coefficients for monetary policy that approximate the overall effect
after one year.
11
                                                          
11 The long-run coefficient on inflation is positive while that on the growth rate of real GDP is negative. The
low procyclicality of total deposits in the period under investigation is confirmed by the coefficient of
simultaneous correlation between the two series (around -14 per cent). The correlation maintains the negative
sign also with respect to lags of the growth rates of GDP (up to the fourth order). This pattern could have been
caused by precautionary motives that increase the growth rate of deposits during periods of recession and
decrease it during booms (when other forms of investment become more appealing). It is worth noting that the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Monetary policy (MP) -0.329 *** 0.118
Real GDP growth -1.112 *** 0.300
Inflation (CPI) 8.184 *** 0.928
Bank char.*size 0.082 ** 0.040
MP effect for:
   large bank -0.314 *** 0.118
   small bank -0.345 *** 0.119
Sum of lagged coefficients (lags=3)
Monetary policy (MP) -0.395 *** 0.142
Real GDP growth -1.336 *** 0.357
Inflation (CPI) 9.835 *** 1.080
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.203
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.579
No of banks, no of observations 531 23364
Bank characteristic: Size
Model 1 Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of 
liquidity26
The effects of a monetary tightening on total deposits are greater for those banks which
have less incentive to shield the effect of a monetary squeeze on this form of liability: small
banks, characterized by deposits in excess of loans, and well capitalized banks that have a
higher capacity to raise other forms of external funds. In all cases (Models 1, 3 and 4) the
null hypothesis that monetary policy effects are equal for small and big banks and for well
and poorly capitalized banks can be rejected at the 95 per cent level of confidence. The
reduction of the deposit growth rate for small banks is around 1 per cent, while that for a
well capitalized bank is 1.5 per cent.
These results are influenced by some specific institutional characteristics of the Italian
financial system. In Italy, small banks have traditionally high capacity in local deposit
markets which reduces their need to raise other forms of external funds.
12 Moreover, the very
high degree of effective deposit insurance makes it hard to argue that the deposits of small
banks are riskier.
13 As for capitalization, in Italy, the impact of bank failures has been very
small, especially with respect to deposits. During our sample period, the share of deposits of
failed banks in total deposits approached 1 per cent only twice, namely in 1987 and 1996
(Boccuzzi, 1998). In this situation deposits with less capitalized banks should not be
considered riskier than others.
The impact of liquidity is more difficult to interpret. Taking only liquidity into account
(Model 2), there are no significant differences between the more and less liquid banks.
Liquidity turns out to be significant only when all the bank-specific characteristic are taken
                                                          
12 Apart from the reaction to monetary policy, the growth rate of deposits is higher for small banks. This can
be checked through the scale variable NW￿￿ in equation (1), which is always highly significant in all the models.
Other things equal, this coefficient captures the high capacity of small banks in local deposit markets.
13 Two explicit limited-coverage deposit insurance schemes (DISs) currently operate in Italy. Both are
funded ex-post; that is, member banks have a commitment to make available to the Funds the necessary
resources should a bank default. All the banks operating in the country, with the exception of mutual banks,
adhere to the main DIS, the ‘Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi’ (FITD). Mutual banks (‘Banche di
Credito Cooperativo’) adhere to a special Fund (‘Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo’)
created for banks belonging to their category. The ‘Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi’ (FITD), the
main DIS, is a private consortium of banks created in 1987 on a voluntary basis. In 1996, as a consequence of
the implementation of European Union Directive 94/19 on deposit guarantee schemes, the Italian Banking Law
regulating the DIS was amended, and FITD became a compulsory DIS. FITD performs its tasks under the
supervision of and in cooperation with the banking supervision authority, Banca d’Italia. The level of
protection granted to each depositor (slightly more than 103,000 euros) is one of the highest in the European
Union. FITD does not adopt any form of deposit coinsurance.27






The second step of the analysis focuses on the response of bank lending to a monetary
shock. The results are presented in Table 6, which is analogous to Table 5, except that the
dependent variable is now the growth rate of nominal total lending.
Again, the estimated long-run multipliers of monetary policy have the expected
negative sign and are significantly different from zero in all models. A 1 per cent increase in
the REPO rate determines a loan reduction of 0.5-0.8 per cent.
14 In this case the overall
effect after one year is slightly lower.
The interaction term between size and monetary policy is insignificant (see Models 1
and 3), which conflicts with the evidence for the US. The results do not support the
prediction of Kashyap and Stein (1995) that the lending volume of smaller banks is more
sensitive to monetary policy than that of large banks. This may be explained by the features
of the Italian banking system, well documented in the literature, which may counterbalance
the distributional effects traditionally associated with the lending channel. There is closer
customer relationship between small firms and small banks (Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri,
1998) which may increase the expected value to the bank of a continuation of the
relationship and thus provide greater incentive to smooth the effect of a monetary squeeze on
credit (Angeloni et al. 1995; Ferri and Pittaluga, 1996). Indeed, the empirical evidence
shows that the intensity of bank-firm relations does reduce the probability that a firm will be
rationed (Conigliani et al., 1997).
A long-standing relationship increases the ability of the bank to learn about the nature
of the borrowing firm. Long experience with the borrower should reduce the expected cost
of lending and therefore increase the bank’s willingness to provide funds (Petersen and
                                                          
14 The long run elasticity of credit to GDP is always significant and larger than one. The sign of the
response of lending to inflation is not unique. The results are mainly not significant at conventional levels. It is
worth noting that this coefficient picks up both the positive effect of inflation on nominal loan growth and the
potential negative effects due to higher interest rates. This second effect was important in the period under
investigation since inflation (and interest rates) fell significantly during the eighties and the nineties.28
Rajan, 1994). As the length of the relation increases, informational problems between bank
and firm are reduced and, with them, the risk premium (Berger and Udell 1995; Conigliani et
al. 1997).
On the same lines, Cottarelli, Ferri and Generale (1995) and Angeloni et al. (1995) find
that large banks tend to adjust lending rates more quickly than other banks. In their analysis,
the dominant explanatory factor is the loan concentration index at the local level, suggesting
that cross-bank differences in price setting can be related to the micro-structure of the credit
market.
Banks with a higher liquidity ratio are better able to buffer their lending activity
against shocks to the availability of external finance, by drawing on their stock of liquid
assets. The lending growth rate decreases by between 0.1 and 0.4 for liquid banks and
between 0.4 and 1.3 for less liquid banks (see Models 2 and 4).
The robustness of these results has been checked with Model 5, which includes the
double interaction between size and liquidity; through this coefficient it is possible to test
whether the effect of liquidity is identical across banks regardless of size. In the spirit of
Kashyap and Stein (2000) the double interaction should be negative, because small banks
have a higher degree of informational asymmetry. The double interaction is negative but not
significant further supporting the thesis that size is not important in distinguishing banks’
responses to monetary policy.
Bank capital interaction with monetary policy has the expected sign but is not
significant at conventional values (see Models 3 and 4). This could be explained by three
factors. First, the measure used, the capital/asset ratio, is only indicative in measuring the
effect of the Basle capital requirements. In fact, it does not contain information on the
structure of the loan portfolio or its risk characteristics. Second, Italian banks, especially the
small ones, may have operated in those years with a level of capitalization that was high
enough for the Basle requirement not to be binding. Third, as noted, the impact of bank






Our third step analyses the effects of a monetary tightening on banks’ liquidity: if the
credit channel is at work, from an aggregate point of view, a given contraction in deposits
causes not only lending but also cash and securities holding to decrease (Kashyap and Stein,
1995; Stein, 1998). Again the distributional effects could play an important role, but since
liquidity is the endogenous variable, the liquidity ratio has not been used as explanatory
variable.
Tables 4 and 7 present the evidence. In this case the optimal number of lags in Model 1
is three. The specifications yield results for liquidity that parallel those for lending volume: a
monetary restriction also determines a significant reduction in cash, securities and interbank
accounts. The implication is twofold. First, the endogenous modelling of liquidity confirms
that variable’s role in shielding the loan portfolio; second, there is no evidence that a lending
reduction due to monetary tightening comes together with an increase in liquidity, which
means that there is no simple reallocation of assets. The estimates show that a 1 per cent
increase in the DREPO leads to a decline in the liquidity growth rate of around 0.4 per cent
after three quarters and 0.3 per cent in the long run. The drop in liquidity is greater for small
banks, which as we have seen have more incentive to shield their customer relationships (see
Table 7).
 	
We have tested the robustness of these results in several ways. First, as monetary
policy indicator we took the interest rate residuals from a two–lag VAR estimated in Mojon
and Peersman (2001).
15 The correlation coefficient between this measure of monetary policy
and DREPO is around 35 per cent (see Figure 2). This variable is designed to avoid
problems of simultaneity and to represent an exogenous monetary policy shock.
                                                          
15 The model is estimated in levels over the period 1980-1998 and includes as endogenous variables Italian
real GDP, Italian consumer price index, the German three-month interest rate, the bilateral DM exchange rate
and the Italian three-month interest rate. The domestic policy shock is identified through a standard Cholesky
decomposition with the variables ordered as above. The specification also includes as exogenous variables a
world commodity price index, US real GDP, the US short term interest rate and a linear trend. For more details
see Peersman and Mojon (2001).30
Figure 2
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In this case too, the estimated short-run and long-run multipliers have the expected
signs and are always significant except for the deposits equation, where the effect of
monetary policy for the average bank is not significant. The ways in which bank-specific
characteristics influence the propagation of a monetary tightening on deposits, lending and
liquidity growth rates do not change. The introduction of dummy variables to take account of
the spikes in the change of the repo interest rate caused by the German re-unification and
EMS crises do not alter the results.
The second test was to introduce additional interaction terms combining the bank-
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The reason for this test is the possible presence of endogeneity between bank-specific
characteristics and the cyclical indicators. For example, nominal liquidity growth may be
higher when inflation is high or banks may be better capitalized when the economy is in a
boom. In the test, however, nothing changed, and the double interaction was almost always
not significant.
Another robustness test was to compare equation (1) with the following model:














where all variables are defined as before, and  ϑ τ  describes a complete set of time dummies.
This model completely eliminates time variation and test whether the three pure time
variables used in equation (1) (prices, income and the monetary policy indicator) capture all
the relevant time effect. Again, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do not
vary much between the two kinds of models, which testifies to the reliability of the cross-
sectional evidence obtained.
16
A geographical control dummy was introduced in each model, taking the value of 1 if
the main seat of the bank is in the North of Italy and 0 if elsewhere. In all regressions, this
dummy proved highly significant but showed a very low value. The lending growth rate of
banks located in the North is only 0.1 per cent higher than that of the banks of the rest of
Italy and the deposit growth rate is only 0.1 per cent lower. In all cases the effects of
monetary policy with respect to size, liquidity and capitalization remained unchanged.
The last robustness check analyzed the maturity structure of banks’ loan portfolio. For
example, one of the main finding of the study is that small banks do not react more sharply
than big banks to a monetary tightening and this could be because they have relatively less
short term lending (see Table 3). This test is also important to consider the potential impact
of the 1993 Banking Law (see footnote 5). So a new regression was performed with the
quarterly growth rate of short-term lending (less than 18 months) as dependent variable.
                                                          
16 The coefficients of the T-models for loan regressions are reported in Ehrmann et al. (2001).32
Table 8 presents the evidence for the model with all bank-specific characteristics (compare
with model 4 in Table 6, which refers to total loans). The model was applied to a new dataset
obtained with the filtering process described in the appendix; the results are very similar to
those obtained with the same dataset used for total lending regressions.
Again in this case, distributional effects are detected only with respect to liquidity,
while size and capitalization show the expected sign but are not significant. The coefficients
of the interaction terms are similar in the two tables.
One important difference is detected in the average coefficient which is lower for
short-term credit. This could be explained by the fact that firms need more short-term
funding in recession, when working capital peaks with growing inventories and customer
credit (similar results are reached by de Haan (2001) for the case of the Netherlands).
17
$ %"#
This paper investigates the existence of cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness
of the bank lending channel for monetary policy transmission in Italy from 1986 to 1998.
The reaction of bank deposits and lending to monetary shocks is analyzed through a panel
approach taking simultaneously into account the bank-specific characteristics of size,
liquidity and capitalization.
                                                          
17 In the model for short-term lending the coefficient on inflation is negative and significant, perhaps
because short-term loans can be adjusted more rapidly and could be more subject to financial myopia (see the






Monetary policy (MP) -0.105 0.137
Real GDP growth 1.244 *** 0.284
Inflation (CPI) -1.379 *** 0.504
Bank char.*MP
    Size 0.082 0.062
    Liquidity 3.192 *** 0.955
    Capitalization 3.052 3.260
    Double interaction
MP effect for:
   large bank 0.303 0.292
   small bank -0.172 0.163
   high liquid 0.384 0.243
   low liquid -0.615 ** 0.246
   well capitalized 0.056 0.222
   poorly capitalized -0.229 0.182
Sum of lagged coefficients (lags=4)
Monetary policy (MP) -0.094 0.122
Real GDP growth 1.115 *** 0.241
Inflation (CPI) -1.236 *** 0.430
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.078
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.726
No of banks, no of observations 551 26448
Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of 
short term lending
Model 4
Bank char.: SIZE, LIQ, CAP34
The main results are the following. At aggregate level, after a monetary restriction
deposits fall and banks reduce their lending. A simultaneous decrease in liquidity suggests
that banks try to shield their loan portfolio by drawing down cash, securities and their net
interbank position. All these effects are significant at conventional levels both in the short
and the long run and are robust to different measures of monetary shocks.
Comparing the effects of a monetary tightening on different kinds of banks, we find
that the impact on deposits is greatest for the banks with less incentive to shield this form of
liability: small banks, with a high ratio of deposits to lending and well-capitalized banks that
have greater capacity to raise other forms of external funds.
As regards the effects on lending, the size of banks does not affect their reaction. Small
banks are not more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than large banks. This finding can be
explained by closer customer relationships, owing to which small banks, which tend to be
more liquid, smooth the effect of a monetary tightening on their supply of credit. This result,
which differs from the conclusions of studies for the United States (Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000), is consistent with previous works
on Italian lending rates (Angeloni et al., 1995 and Cottarelli et al., 1997).
Banks’ liquidity is the most significant factor enabling them to contain the effect of a
deposit contraction on lending. Less well capitalized banks suffer more from a monetary
tightening, but this result is not significant at conventional values. Nevertheless, the measure
of capitalization used, the capital/asset ratio, is only indicative in measuring the effect of the
Basle capital requirements, so this result needs further investigation.
Our results are in line with Ehrmann et al. (2001), which in comparing the role of
banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area, also found that liquidity is important
in characterizing a bank’s reaction to a monetary policy action. On the other hand, factors
like the size and capitalization of a bank are often not important. The lack of size and
capitalization effects could be explained by a lower degree of informational asymmetries: the
role of government, banking networks, and especially a low number of banking failures help
reduce informational frictions.&!!*#+
#!#*
The data are taken from the Bank of Italy Supervisory Reports database. Deposits
include certificate of deposits (longer-term CDs were subject to the reserve requirement until
May 1994). Lending does not include bad debts and repurchase agreements. Liquidity is
equal to the sum of cash, interbank deposits, securities and repurchase agreements at book
value (repos have been considered for statistical reasons). The size of a bank is measured by
the logarithm of the total balance sheet. Capitalization is given by capital and reserves. The
growth rates are computed by first difference of variables in logs.
In assembling our sample, the so-called special credit institutions (long-term credit
banks) have been excluded since they were subject to different supervisory regulations
regarding the maturity range of their assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, special long-term
credit sections of commercial banks have been considered part of the banks to which they
belonged.
Particular attention has been paid to mergers. In practice, it is assumed that these took
place at the beginning of the sample period, summing the balance-sheet items of the merging
parties. For example, if bank A is incorporated by bank B at time , bank B is reconstructed
backward as the sum of the merging banks before the merger.
Data are quarterly and are not seasonally adjusted. Three seasonal dummies and a
constant are also included.
For cleaning, all observations for which deposits, lending and liquidity are equal to or
less than zero were excluded. After this treatment, the sample includes 759 banks and 35,678
observations.
An observation has been defined as an outlier if it lies within the top or bottom
percentile of the distribution of the quarterly growth rate of deposits, lending and liquidity. If
a bank has an outlier in the quarterly growth rate of deposits (lending or liquidity) it is
completely removed from the sample with respect to the deposit (lending or liquidity)36
regression. The final datasets for deposits, lending and liquidity regressions were composed,
respectively, of 629, 587 and 531 banks (27047, 25241 and 23364 observations).
A “small” bank has the average size of the banks below the third quartile, while a
“big” bank has the average size of the banks above the 95
th percentile.
18 A “low liquid” bank
has the average liquidity ratio of the banks below the 10
th percentile; a “liquid” bank, that of
the banks above the 90
th percentile. A “poorly capitalized” bank has a capital ratio equal to
the average capital ratio below the 10
th percentile, a “well capitalized” bank, that of the
banks above the 90
th percentile. Since the characteristics of each bank could change over
time, percentiles have been worked out on mean values.
                                                          
18 This partitioning produces a result similar to that obtained by the splitting criteria used by the Bank of
Italy in January 1995 to define size groups. In this case “big” banks are those with total balance-sheet items
larger than 8.3 billions euro, while “small” banks have less than 2.8 billions euro. For a more detailed
description of this criterion see Banca d’Italia (1995).	
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